Mismatch unemployment in the Finnish labour market by Hakola, Timopekka
Mismatch Unemployment in the Finnish Labour Market
Economics
Master's thesis
Timopekka Hakola
2016
Department of Economics
Aalto University
School of Business
Powered by TCPDF (www.tcpdf.org)
  
 
 
 
 
 
Author  Timopekka Hakola 
Title of thesis  Mismatch Unemployment in the Finnish Labour Market 
Degree  Master of Science (Economics and Business Administration) 
Degree programme  Economics 
Thesis advisor(s)  Pekka Ilmakunnas 
Year of approval  2016 Number of pages  56 Language  English 
Abstract 
 
In this paper, I study mismatch between job-seekers and vacancies across sectors in 
the Finnish labour market between 2006 and the beginning of 2015. The amount of 
lost hires caused by the imbalance between job-seekers and vacancies is measured by 
a mismatch index, which allows us to construct an efficient allocation of job-seekers 
across sectors. Further, this efficient allocation is used to define a counterfactual un-
employment rate to measure the magnitude of mismatch.  
 
Studying the causes of unemployment is increasingly important especially in Finland, 
where the share of long-term unemployed job-seekers has shown a steady increase af-
ter the financial crisis. This paper presents mismatch theory as one possible explana-
tion for the prolonged unemployment in the Finnish labour market. 
 
This study utilizes the labour market data from Local Labour Offices made available by 
the Ministry of Employment and the Economy. The rich panel data set consists of 
monthly information on job seekers, vacancies and hires between 2006 and April 2015. 
The data is compiled both in geographical and occupational dimensions to allow the 
estimation of a mismatch index across both sectors.  
 
Mismatch measurements indicate possible gains to be made in hires by allocating job-
seekers efficiently. Spatially lost hires vary monthly between 5 and 7 percent when sec-
tor-specific efficiencies are considered. Occupational mismatch indices show wider 
variation ranging monthly from 2 to 14 percent depending on the level of disaggrega-
tion. Mismatch peaked especially sharply across occupations as the financial crisis 
burst in 2008. According to the approximation of counterfactual unemployment rates, 
mismatch explains around one fifth of the aggregate unemployment rate. Most nota-
bly, the results indicate that mismatch is currently increasing on all dimensions. In line 
with previous studies from the US and Sweden, mismatch is more severe across occu-
pations than regions.  
 
 
Keywords  matching model, mismatch, unemployment, labour market, mismatch in-
dex, labour economics, työttömyys, työmarkkinat, työvoiman kohtaanto 
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1 Introduction 
The modelling of labour market dynamics is central to understand the foundation of unem-
ployment, which dilutes welfare, income, equality and worker skills. Typically the labour 
market is described as flows of jobs and workers constantly reorganising themselves; jobs 
are being created and others destroyed and some workers being hired and others losing their 
jobs. These constant reallocations create frictions that lead to the simultaneous existence of 
unemployed job-seekers and vacancies (Cahuc et al. 2014). Recently, the research has taken 
matching function as the main approach to incorporate these frictions into the labour market 
models.  
The matching model provides a framework to study labour market mismatch as well. Mis-
match refers to “a theory of former steel workers remaining near a closed plant in the hope 
that it reopens” (Shimer, 2007). Hence, mismatch concept attempts to answer, whether un-
employment is affected by job-seekers looking for work in the wrong sectors. In other words, 
it aims to encompass the degree of heterogeneity in job-seekers across various dimensions, 
which can relate to worker skill, location or occupation (Petrongolo and Pissarides, 2001).  
As weak economic development in Finland since 2008 has initiated prolonged unemploy-
ment, it raises interest, whether labour mismatch has hindered the recovery of the labour 
market. Looking more closely the labour flows in the Finnish labour market reveal a contin-
uous decrease in the job-finding rate simultaneously with a lower unemployment inflow now 
than pre-crisis. Sahin et al. (2014) argue that mismatch could explain these type of dynamics.  
In this paper, I utilize a panel data set to study mismatch unemployment in the Finnish labour 
market between 2006 and April 2015. The data set includes monthly information of job-
seekers, vacancies and hires across geographical and occupational dimensions. The empiri-
cal analysis has three phases. First, the matching functions are estimated to obtain sector-
specific matching efficiencies and vacancy shares. Then, taking the observed vacancies as 
given, I measure the amount of lost hires produced by mismatch in the Finnish labour market 
across regions and occupations. Third, counterfactual unemployment rates in the absence of 
mismatch are calculated and compared with actual rates to demonstrate the magnitude of 
mismatch. 
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Using the constructed mismatch index this thesis aims to answer how imbalanced is the dis-
tribution of unemployed job-seekers given the observed productive efficiencies, matching 
efficiencies and vacancies across the labour market. Especially the changes in the matching 
process before and after the latest financial crisis will be discussed.  In addition, the prevail-
ing characteristics of the Finnish labour market are described thoroughly. 
This paper complements other Finnish studies that focus on labour matching with disaggre-
gated data and provides a fresh angle with the mismatch index which, to my knowledge, has 
not been measured before with Finnish data. Additionally, the mismatch index approach 
allows convenient international comparison with studies from the US and Sweden. Mis-
match measurements might have relevance also from the policymaker perspective. Aggre-
gate labour market policies may have an inefficient effect on employment if severe labour 
mismatch weakens the labour market matching process. Moreover, policies supporting la-
bour mobility could dilute geographical mismatch or means that improve labour re-educa-
tion could suppress possible occupational mismatch.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the development of the 
matching model and presents the Beveridge curve as an early tool for illustrating labour 
market matching. Section 3 discusses the features of the baseline matching model. After the 
introduction of this widely studied model, the framework is utilized in Section 4 as a basis 
to construct the theory behind mismatch index. Section 5 goes through the panel data set that 
is used in the empirical measurements. Section 6 presents the results across geographical 
and occupational sectors and final section concludes.   
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2 Background 
This section covers how the matching model has made inroads into become the prevailing 
approach to explaining labour market dynamics. The second part presents the Beveridge 
curve as an important antecedent in modelling labour market matching.  
Matching function is based on the assumption that the hiring process in the labour market is 
time-consuming and affected by transaction costs and frictions (Pissarides, 2000). The im-
portance of frictions in explaining unemployment has been understood already in the early 
generations of labour market studies, but the modelling proved to be difficult for a long time 
(Petrongolo and Pissarides, 2001). The discussion about frictions in macroeconomic theories 
of labour markets dates back to the aftermath of Great Depression in the 1930’s. Hicks 
(1932) was one of the earliest academics to distinguish the effect of frictions on unemploy-
ment, but Keynes (1936) was perhaps the first one to use the term “frictional” unemploy-
ment, even though he defined this kind of unemployment only to be compatible with full 
employment (Petrongolo and Pissarides, 2001). Keynes presented high persistent unemploy-
ment as one kind of steady state equilibrium. Until then the predominant classical view es-
tablished by economists including Alfred Marshall and David Ricardo understood economy 
as a self-regulating mechanism with a unique steady-state equilibrium, which could not eas-
ily rationalize the existence of involuntary unemployment. 
An antecedent for the matching model was the proposition of the “natural rate” of unem-
ployment by Friedman (1968) and Phelps (1967) as an attempt to distinguish the structural 
factor of unemployment (Yashiv, 2007). Lilien (1982) argues that the natural rate can be 
thought of as a relatively constant level of frictional unemployment necessary to carry out 
the continuous process of labour allocation. Nevertheless, the introduction of the concept of 
natural rate by Friedman and Phelps was an attempt to explain the breakdown of the rela-
tionship between unemployment and inflation constructed by Phillips (1958), which was a 
prevailing approach until the 1970’s. 
What led to the current search and matching model was the goal of developing a theory 
where unemployment would be an equilibrium outcome. Phelps (1968) and Mortensen 
(1970) summarized frictions in a labour flow model, which depended on the firm’s relative 
7 
 
wage offer. The biggest contribution of their model was the realization of large flows of 
workers and jobs in the labour market (Petrongolo and Pissarides, 2001).  
2.1 Beveridge curve  
The negative relationship between job vacancies and unemployment was empirically ob-
served already before the development of the matching model. Presenting Beveridge curve 
is therefore apparent when studying labour mismatch, since it has been partly used to study 
structural unemployment shocks in the past (see e.g. Blanchard and Diamond, 1989). The 
downward sloping curve in unemployment-vacancy-locus was named as the Beveridge 
curve after William Beveridge, who was the first to observe such relationship in 1930’s. Yet, 
the graphical and mathematical illustration remained to the later generations of macroeco-
nomic studies (see e.g. Dow and Dicks-Mireaux, 1958).  
Figure 1 below demonstrates the simple downward sloping Beveridge curve in unemploy-
ment-vacancy locus. In a textbook case, an exogenous rise in mismatch (or some other real-
location shock) decreases the rate of job matching at a given labour market tightness and 
consequently the curve shifts outwards of the origin (shift from BC to BC’). Now, with the 
same amount of vacancies (v*) there are more unemployed job-seekers (u* shifts to u’), 
while higher mismatch decreases the amount of hires. In contrast, when mismatch declines 
the BC curve moves towards the origin and unemployment decreases from u’ to u*. 
 
Beveridge curve (BC) 
v* 
u u* 
 BC’ 
v 
u’ 
Figure 1 Beveridge curve 
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Consequently, movements along the curve are associated with the state of the business cycle 
(Arpaia et al., 2014). In an economic downturn labour demand is often relatively weak, sug-
gesting that firms are reluctant to hire, leading to a low level of unfilled vacancies simulta-
neously with high unemployment. The equilibrium unemployment moves down the curve. 
Vice versa, positive labour demand shocks raise the labour demand and move the steady-
state unemployment upwards along the curve. 
Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) form the UV-curve as an equilibrium relation that equates 
flows into unemployment with flows out of unemployment. They suggest that if the outflow 
from unemployment is given by the matching function, the Beveridge curve slopes down-
ward as empirically witnessed. Hence, the matching model does not contradict with the ev-
idence of the Beveridge curve, even though it is consistent with other mechanisms as well. 
Moreover, they list the estimations of equilibrium relation and Beveridge curve as a first 
strand of studies, where empirical evidence on matching function stems from.  
Especially in the early literature estimating the empirical Beveridge curve has been popular, 
since it exploits data only on stock variables, which were better available than flow variables 
at the time (Lahtonen, 2006). Even today there is a vast amount of studies from US and from 
Europe using cross-country panel data to study BC curve (see e.g. Arpaia et al., 2014; Or-
landi, 2012 and Bonthuis et al., 2013). These studies are popular as they provide a clear and 
explicit view on labour matching.  
However, this measurement of static difference in stocks is prone to changes in unemploy-
ment duration that hamper test of changes in UV analysis (Rodenburg, 2011). Further, the 
approach suffers some major shortcomings, including sensitivity to sample size and the im-
possibility to distinguish the stability of the shift (Arpaia et al. 2014). As any other labour 
market study, also Beveridge curve measurements are challenged by the unreliability of va-
cancy data and before the introduction of the search model, the Beveridge curve dynamics 
abstracted from labour force entry and exit and omits job-to-job flows (Elsby et al., 2015). 
Hence, later studies have enriched the model to account for these as well and have focused 
more on estimating the shifts indirectly through job finding and separation rates (e.g. Daly 
et al., 2012; Barnichon and Figura, 2010). 
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Still, Beveridge curve has a relevant meaning, when studying labour mismatch. According 
to Blanchard and Diamond (1989), studying the UV-relationship can provide a lot of infor-
mation on the effectiveness of the matching process. This is usually linked to the shifts of 
the Beveridge curve in the unemployment-vacancy space (Arpaia et al., 2014). Albaek and 
Hansen (2004) suggest that an outward shift in the Beveridge curve implies a rise in unem-
ployment for reasons other than lack of labour demand. They propose two main channels for 
this shift: An increase in the reallocation of workers, which implies a rise in both vacancies 
and unemployment or an increase in mismatch between vacancies and job seekers, suggest-
ing a decreased amount of hires with the current level of vacancies and unemployment. 
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3 Matching model 
This section introduces the standard matching model as a theoretical framework, which the 
empirical part of the paper is structured on. Further, this will be extended as a multi-sector 
version of the standard model as an underlying form for the empirical measurements.  
The matching model presented in this section follows the model suggested by Petrongolo 
and Pissarides (2001). The standard model describes how the stock of vacancies matches 
with the stock of job-seekers. In its simplest form, the aggregate matching function can be 
written as  
 𝑀 = 𝑚(𝑈, 𝑉), (1) 
where M is the number of jobs formed at a given time interval, U is the number of job-
seekers and V is the number of vacant jobs. Commonly, U consists of unemployed job seek-
ers, but also employed workers or individuals outside labour force looking for a job may be 
included. The function is assumed to be nonnegative (MV > 0, MU > 0) and increasing in both 
arguments M (0, U) = M (V, 0) = 0. Also, a general assumption is that the function is concave. 
This implies that if either the number of job seekers or vacancies increase, then the number 
of matches increase but at decreasing rate. Further, in discrete-time models if M is the flow 
of matches and U and V are the stocks at the beginning of the period, then M(U,V) ≤ 
min(U,V). If no frictions arise in the matching process, i.e. job-seekers and vacancies would 
be instantaneously matched, the number of matches would be M = min (U,V).  
3.1 Empirical specification 
Empirical analysis usually prefers log-linear form as a functional form of the matching 
model implying a Cobb-Douglas function 
 𝑀𝑡 = 𝛿𝑈𝑡
𝛼𝑉𝑡
𝛽
 (2) 
where t denotes time, δ is a scale parameter and α and β are elasticity parameters with respect 
to U and V. Further, most studies compiled by Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) imply that 
matching function imposes constant returns to scale. Then α + β = 1, otherwise not. 
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 𝑀(𝑉, 𝑈)
𝑉
= 𝑀 (1,
𝑈
𝑉
) = 𝑚(𝜃) (3) 
The returns to scale of the matching function raise plenty of interest, since it reveals if a 
larger labour market in terms of vacancies and job-seekers have a better matching efficiency. 
Also, returns to scale above one would imply the possibility of several steady state equilibria. 
According to Pissarides (2000), constant returns ensure constant unemployment rate along 
the balanced growth-path. 
However, the common log-linear specification has received critique due to the lack of theo-
retical and micro foundations. Moreover, the constant elasticity imposed by Cobb Douglas 
form is not always empirically supported. Hence, some other forms have proven to be more 
suitable for addressing non-linearity in the empirical matching process. For instance, Yashiv 
(2000) uses a translog function to address the non-linearity. Other popular alternatives in 
addition to log-linear and trans-log specification are non-linear and CES functions.  
Coles and Smith (1998) note that aggregation of data, when job-seekers and vacancies across 
sectors do not interact, may bias the returns-to-scale downwards. This has been discussed in 
the Finnish context as well. Kangasharju et al. (2005) argue that the empirical evidence on 
constant returns to scale becomes less evident, when the basic Cobb-Douglas model is ex-
tended or when disaggregated data is used. Moreover, they note that translog specification 
seems to provide constantly higher returns to scale. Interestingly, when they include the flow 
of new vacancies and unemployment spells in explanatory variables, they find clear constant 
returns with Cobb-Douglas specification.  
3.2 Stock-flow matching 
A general assumption in matching function studies is random search, where job seekers pick 
a vacant job randomly and then apply for it. Sampling vacancies is assumed to be time con-
suming in random matching unlike in the stock-flow model. Random search is a convenient 
assumption to simplify the estimation and is sometimes also realistic if by presumption there 
is some luck or coincidence in hearing about vacant jobs (Petrongolo and Pissarides, 2001). 
In fact, many empirical studies approach matching from this assumption.  
In real life, search contains arguably a systematic element, which is noted in the so called 
stock-flow matching. In this approach, agents are seen as heterogeneous and disaggregated 
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into old and new traders. Gregg and Petrongolo (2005) note that thanks to different infor-
mation channels, workers have information about the available vacancies. They describe 
stock-flow matching as follows. When a worker loses her job, she screens the available stock 
of vacancies to see if her skills match with any of them and applies simultaneously as many 
jobs as she likes. Then upon contact the worker and the firm decide together whether they 
form a match or continue to search. Further, the unmatched keep searching because there are 
no other available trading partners, since they scanned all of them in the beginning of the 
period. Following, the job seekers and vacant jobs will attempt to match with the flow of 
new workers and vacancies. Symmetrically flow of new vacancies search for a match on the 
current stock of unemployed. Gregg and Petrongolo (2005) remark that under stock-flow 
matching traders have a high probability to match in the first period, when they enter the 
market. After this initial sampling matching rates fall, because agents have to wait for new 
entries to trade with.  
Hence, in the stock-flow model frictions are caused by the heterogeneity of agents and mis-
match between them and not by coordination failure (Lahtonen, 2006). A similar view is 
presented by Coles and Smith (1998), who demonstrate s simple model of what they call 
marketplace matching that describes how the stock of traders on one side of the market 
matches with the flow on the other side. Using British job market data they find support for 
the view, since the matching behaviour of workers change with the duration of unemploy-
ment.    
Stock-flow approach emphasizes the relevance of job-seeker and vacancy inflows during the 
observation period into the beginning-of-the period pools, because the use of stock data on 
a continuous matching process may raises some issues, when analysing aggregate matching 
functions (Gregg and Petrongolo, 2005). Gregg and Petrongolo address this issue as a tem-
poral aggregation problem, which occurs when a continuous-time matching process is esti-
mated with discrete-time (stock) data. Because dependent variable (the number of hires or 
matches) is a flow variable and explanatory variables are stock variables, this issue arises 
because the explanatory variables are depleted by the response variable (Lahtonen, 2006). 
Gregg and Petrongolo focus on this problem by proposing a combination of beginning-of-
the-period stocks with new inflow during the time interval. I use this approach of combining 
stock and inflow also in calculating the mismatch indices. 
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Choosing between random search and stock-flow matching is not unambiguous. Finnish 
studies have found evidence supporting both approaches as the outcomes are not fully con-
sistent. Lahtonen (2006) finds that unemployed job-seekers are more likely to match with 
the flow of new vacancies than with the stock of existing vacancies. However, in exceptional 
market conditions as in the depression in the 1990’s Lahtonen finds some evidence on ran-
dom search with time-consuming search due to the vast amount of job-seekers per vacant 
job. Moreover, using disaggregated data Soininen (2006) finds support for stock-flow match-
ing in the Finnish context as well, but on the other hand on the aggregate level the traditional 
matching function with random search gets more support. Thus, probably the actual behav-
iour of job-seekers lies somewhere between these assumptions. 
Still, the attributes assumed concerning the matching function are important when choosing 
the type of data. Gregg and Petrongolo (2005) note that labour market flows play a crucial 
role on the right-hand side of estimated matching equations. Nevertheless, in my case the 
choice of data is not self-evident. The problem is that the data set does not specify, whether 
a hired job-seeker previously belonged to stock or inflow. The information of the duration 
of unemployment is not enough itself. Hence, to encompass stock-flow matching in the best 
possible way, vacancies and unemployed job-seekers are calculated in the spirit of Gregg 
and Petrongolo (2005) by adding the inflow of new vacancies and job-seekers to the stock 
at the beginning of time period. This choice follows the empirical choice of Marthin (2012), 
who have similar issues in modelling stock-flow search with Swedish data. Yet, it is worth 
remembering that adding complete flows may bias estimates upwards compared to using 
stocks only (Ilmakunnas and Pesola, 2003).  
3.3 Matching efficiency 
Matching efficiency plays a vital part when assessing the labour market mismatch. Variation 
in matching efficiency is one of the main driver of fluctuations in unemployment rate (Lubik, 
2013. The rate at which matches are formed from the factors of production, the job-seekers 
and vacancies, has a significant effect on the duration and rate of unemployment (Bunders, 
2003). Moreover, Hynninen et al. (2009) discover that inefficiencies have a significantly 
increasing effect on unemployment. Regionally, the differences in efficiencies cause varia-
tion in how many matches regions are able to produce with given inputs. Commonly, differ-
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ences across regions reflect the slow operation of equilibrium mechanisms, such as the in-
sufficient response of migration to employment or the slow response of wages to changes in 
labour demand or supply (Hynninen et al. 2009). The regional disparities may be caused by 
skill mismatch, job search intensity or the functioning of local labour offices (LLO’s). Usu-
ally, they are found to be persistent over time. 
Hynninen (2007) points out that total matching efficiency is divided in two parts: technical 
efficiency and cost efficiency. In the context of the labour market, the discussion of effi-
ciency mostly relates with the technical component, which is derived from production the-
ory. It explains how efficiently matches are produced by given levels of job seekers and 
vacancies by capturing the factors that are independent of the amounts of inputs (Hynninen, 
2007). Cost efficiency, on the other hand, is not actually relevant in labour matching process, 
because the prices of inputs cannot be determined as in other production functions and thus 
cost function cannot be derived in this case. 
In terms of aggregate matching efficiency, Barnichon and Figura (2013) highlight two ef-
fects that cause variation in efficiency. First, the composition of unemployment pool may 
change over time. The amount of long-term unemployed may for instance become more 
represented in the labour market. This composition effect causes variation in the average 
search efficiency and therefore affects matching efficiency as well. The second effect is the 
dispersion effect, in which the aggregate job finding probability is driven down by the fact 
that other submarkets have higher labour market tightness than others.  
Problematically, Barnichon and Figura (2013) argue that standard matching function does 
not take the composition and dispersion effects into account, since it assumes constant 
matching efficiency. This assumption of time-invariant matching efficiency is still widely 
used in empirics since it seems to provide a relatively good approximate description of the 
labour market. Barnichon and Figura remark that this assumption requires a relatively stable 
degree of heterogeneity in the labour market to be valid. They note that aggregate efficiency 
has pro-cyclical behaviour because these composition and dispersion effects are procyclical. 
This view is supported by Ilmakunnas and Pesola (2003), who find pro-cyclical variation in 
matching efficiencies according to frontier estimation suggesting that regional matching ef-
ficiencies are highly dependent on business cycles. Moreover, their measurements reveal a 
negative trend in efficiency. 
15 
 
3.4 On-the-job search 
In reality, unemployed workers form only one part of the whole pool of job seekers. Instead, 
job-to-job transitions or flows directly out of the labour force to employment form a large 
number of matches as well (Petrongolo and Pissarides, 2001). While the importance of ad-
justing the matching model studies to include also currently employed job-seekers has been 
emphasized by previous studies, the majority of empirical measurements ignore this due to 
data scarcity (Lahtonen, 2006).  
Exceptionally Broersma and Van Ours (1999) include employed workers in their empirical 
study and find that accounting for non-unemployed job searchers affects the returns to scale 
of the matching function. Also Pissarides (1994) argues that adding employed job-seekers 
to the model showed that on-the-job search creates congestion for unemployed workers. Fur-
ther he notes that firms actually direct more vacancies to employed workers, which leads to 
ranking between employed and unemployed job seekers.  
By default the dependent variable of job-seekers in my data set includes only unemployed 
job seekers. Adjusting the measurements to allow on-the-job search is somewhat problem-
atic, since if employed workers looking for a new job do not report to the Local Labour 
Offices as job-seekers, they are impossible to recognize in data analysis in this case. None-
theless, the effect of on-the-job search can be controlled as far as the registered employed 
job-seekers are concerned. In Section 6.3 the effect of allowing on-the-job search is studied 
more carefully by adding the registered and employed job seekers in the data. Overall, it 
seems that employed job-seeker do not affect the shares of job-seekers across sectors and 
does not therefore affect mismatch measurement significantly. 
3.5 Mismatch 
Defining the type of mismatch discussed in this paper is crucial. Essentially, mismatch re-
flects the poor compatibility of job seekers and open vacancies. As Petrongolo and Pissarides 
(2001) note, mismatch is an “empirical concept that measures the degree of heterogeneity in 
the labour market across a number of dimensions, usually restricted to skills, industrial sec-
tor, and location”.  
Mismatch is a part of empirical work focusing on the modelling of individual behaviour 
attempting to establish microfoundations for the matching model. These studies reflect the 
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strand of studies, which use data on individual transitions to estimate hazard functions for 
unemployed workers (Petrongolo and Pissarides, 2001).  
Variables affecting the aggregate matching rate besides the matching function are classified 
in two groups. First group is the search contribution of the individuals and the second group 
includes shifts unrelated to individual search decisions such as aggregation issues and tech-
nological advances in job matching. Mismatch can be studied from the second point of view 
as a microfoundation for the aggregate matching function.  
Petrongolo and Pissarides suggest that mismatch can originate from various sources: 
1) Skill mismatch: Differences in the skills possessed by labour and de-
manded by firms for a given position.  
2) Geographical mismatch: Imperfect labour mobility, while job seekers and 
vacancies are located in various regions. In earlier literature, these differ-
ences in location are also referred to as imbalance in numbers in the local 
market. 
3) Industry mismatch:  The need for industry-specific skills that may not eas-
ily be learned by generally available measures. 
The measurement of mismatch has important implications. If mismatch would be non-exist-
ent in all three dimensions noted above, vacancies and job-seekers would match instantane-
ously. Yet, because of the existence of mismatch, labour market matching is characterized 
by the search and application process (Petrongolo and Pissarides, 2001). Hence, an increase 
in mismatch indicates that at a given level of job-seekers and vacancies, the amount of hires 
must fall implying a shift in aggregate matching function.  
Many of the earliest formal models of mismatch classified as a source for unemployment 
ground on urn-ball structure, which was first studied by probability theorists (see e.g. Hall, 
1977). In this framework, firms play the role of urns and workers the role of balls, which are 
randomly placed in urns. Job seekers and vacancies are assumed to be homogeneous and 
without knowledge about each other’s actions (Lahtonen, 2006). Even with exactly the same 
number of balls and urns, the random assignment causes some jobs to remain unfilled as 
some jobs receive many workers, of whom only one can be hired. Petrongolo and Pissarides 
(2001) suggest that in this setting the lack of information about other workers’ actions gen-
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erates coordination failures, which leads to unemployment. Nonetheless, the approach sug-
gested by Hall (2000) has more resemblance on mismatch. He links the importance of the 
number of workers per location and the unemployment rate. The random assignment of 
workers causes congestion in some locations, which decreases the matching rate.   
Mismatch studies trace also back to the theories of “sectoral shift hypothesis” and structural 
unemployment, which was thought to arise from fast structural change in the economy 
(Petrongolo and Pissarides, 2001). That is, supply shocks such as advances in technology or 
rapid changes in oil markets speed up the need of workers to adapt their skills to match with 
the requirements of firms. This skill mismatch then leads to longer unemployment duration 
with the given number of vacancies. Structural shifts have been studied for instance by Lilien 
(1982), who suggests that the distribution of jobs and workers changes over a business cycle 
possibly explaining fluctuations in aggregate employment. Nonetheless, the positive corre-
lation between unemployment growth and the dispersion of employment growth reported by 
Lilien has been criticized as unable to make a distinction between aggregate demand fluctu-
ations and sectoral shifts (Petrongolo and Pissarides, 2001).   
The theory of deriving the matching function over distinct markets is an interesting perspec-
tive for mismatch, since it resembles the geographical mismatch in the way that regional 
labour supply and demand do not match in either case. This derivation relies on the existence 
of disequilibrium across several micro markets and assumes limited labour mobility 
(Petrongolo and Pissarides, 2001). Assumingly, these micro markets do not suffer from fric-
tions but from a disequilibrium of job seekers and vacancies, which means that the demand 
and supply of labour in each market are unequal. The conditions for this matching function 
to exist are the frictions created by the non-existent mobility of labour and capital across 
markets, which give rise to the aggregate matching function (Petrongolo and Pissarides, 
2001). This immobility implies that markets with unemployment can coexist with markets 
with vacancies, but distinctively to the idea of mismatch, no market has both since no fric-
tions arise within the market. In other words, the short side of each distinct market clears.1  
Aggregation over all markets gives an aggregate matching function that contains both va-
cancies and job seekers. In the case of perfect mobility, this aggregate matching function 
would not exist, since labour would move until the short side would clear (Petrongolo and 
                                                 
1 The matching function in each market is Mi = min(Ui,Vi) 
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Pissarides, 2001). Similar to the geographical mismatch discussed earlier, the disequilibrium 
in this approach refers to imbalance in labour demand and supply in each market. Nonethe-
less, distinctively to mismatch, in the aggregation problem markets with unemployment can 
coexist with markets with job vacancies, but no market has both (Petrongolo and Pissarides, 
2001).  
Mismatch hypothesis has provided mixed results in empirical studies. Petrongolo and Pis-
sarides (2001) note that mismatch has neither been successful in explaining large fluctua-
tions nor secular rises in the unemployment rate in different countries. Hence, they argue 
that mismatch may explain some shifts in the aggregate matching function but are not cred-
ible as the main shift variable. However, according to Petrongolo and Pissarides mismatch 
functions at the time suffered from many problems and thus mismatch may explain more of 
the variance in matching than found in the literature. Hence, in the later research mismatch 
has been further developed to encompass these variations (see e.g. Albaek and Hansen, 2004; 
Shimer, 2007).  
In this paper, the theoretical framework that is used to conceptualize mismatch in unemploy-
ment follows the idea of a mismatch index by Sahin et al. (2014). This method grounds on 
the presumption that an economy consists of several distinct sectors, which are segmented 
by industry, occupation, geography, or a combination of these attributes. Each separate la-
bour market is assumed to be frictional, enabling the use of matching function. The method 
constructed by Sahin is still relatively new and has been used in only few international pa-
pers. Marthin (2012) studies unemployment mismatch in Sweden with the index and Shibata 
(2013) utilizes the method to the Japanese labour market. Most recently, Erken et al. (2015) 
use a simple mismatch index without heterogeneity between the sectors to study mismatch 
in Netherlands. They find that from international perspective mismatch explains only a small 
share of the rise in unemployment during the latest financial crisis.  
Other recent studies have estimated the extent of mismatch in the labour market by various 
methods. Barnichon and Figura (2013) propose an approach to study the cyclicality of labour 
mismatch over a long time sample. They focus on the simultaneous roles of the dispersion 
and composition effects.  They claim that the standard matching function, implied that job 
finding rate depends only on labour market tightness, was stable in the US over 1967-2007 
but after that the observed job finding rate was significantly lower than the one estimated by 
the matching function. Hence, the authors argue that the matching function does not fully 
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capture the heterogeneities across individuals, which are key to understand the fluctuations 
in the job finding rate.  
Shimer (2007) proposes a dynamic stochastic model of mismatch. The environment mod-
elled by Shimer resembles the proposition by Sahin et al. Nonetheless, the crucial difference 
is that Shimer handles a vacancy as a manifestation of a firm’s failure to hire and not as 
firm’s effort to hire. Also, the quantitative behaviour of the model has close resemblance 
with a stock-flow matching model. Shimer’s approach emphasizes that unemployed workers 
are attached to an occupation and geographic location, where jobs are currently scarce. 
3.6 Findings on Finnish labour market matching 
The labour market has many peculiar features in different countries, which is why implica-
tions from an international research using local data are hard to draw across borders. Fortu-
nately, several empirical papers have also studied the characteristics of labour market match-
ing in Finland. The data ranges from regionally aggregated panel data to aggregate time 
series and these studies give a thorough review of the labour market matching in the Finnish 
labour market. In this section, I will present some of the most comprehensive papers.  
In her dissertation, Hynninen (2007) concentrates on the technical efficiency of the matching 
function by using regionally aggregated panel data from the local labour offices in Finland. 
Her thesis consists of four sections, which first study the spatial spill-overs in local matching 
function from the neighbouring areas. Second, a model with heterogeneous job seekers is 
introduced to provide estimates for employability from the job seeker’s point of view. These 
results imply a negative effect on matches in LLO’s as the share of long-term unemployed 
job seekers increase. Third essay relates labour market heterogeneity with population den-
sity, which shows that in high-density areas the heterogeneity of job seekers is emphasized 
in matching. Fourth, using stochastic frontier approach Hynninen supports the view of Il-
makunnas and Pesola (2003) that technical efficiency in matching shows a negative trend in 
the Finnish labour market.  
Ilmakunnas and Pesola (2003), focus on the technical efficiency in the regional matching 
using annual observations for the period 1988-1997. By utilizing stochastic frontier approach 
as an estimation method for matching efficiency, they find evidence for constant returns to 
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scale with the unemployment outflow as dependent variable. Moreover, Ilmakunnas and Pe-
sola find a negative trend as well as pro-cyclical variation in the matching efficiency. Fol-
lowing closely similar stochastic frontier approach, Hynninen et al. (2009) estimate the re-
gional differences with Finnish data. They find that average unemployment rate would de-
crease by 2.4 percentage points if all LLO’s worked with full efficiency.  
Lahtonen (2006) studies the effect of heterogeneous job seekers on matching function and 
focuses especially on the characteristics of job seekers. By disaggregating the pool of job 
seekers into three education groups, Lahtonen finds a positive effect on matches for primary 
educated job seekers, whereas seekers with secondary education display negative effect on 
matches. Also, long-term unemployed job seekers and seekers under 25 or over 50 are found 
to have negative effect on the number of monthly matches. Moreover, along with the results 
by Hynninen (2007), Lahtonen suggests that high-density areas are more productive in 
matching than low-density areas. 
Soininen (2006) studies the matching efficiency in Finland by using cointegrated VAR-
method to analyse aggregate matching process, stock-flow matching and matching between 
occupational groups. Using aggregate time-series data from 1982 to 2005 Soininen finds that 
aggregate matching process changed severely between the 80s and the mid-90s in Finland. 
In addition Soininen finds that unemployment duration has a negative effect on the proba-
bility of re-employment. Yet, stock-flow matching does not find support on the aggregate 
level but significant variation is found between occupational groups.  
Bunders (2003) measures the efficiency of the matching process with Finnish panel data in 
the period 1988-2002. The average duration of vacancies is used as proxy for matching ef-
ficiency. The study suggests that the matching efficiency varied between the time periods 
and was least efficient at the end during 2001-2002. Moreover, he finds significant differ-
ences between regional and occupation groups and in especially Southern Finland the mis-
match is higher than in the north and east of the country. Also, Bunders finds increasing 
economies of scale in the matching function.  
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4 Mismatch measurement 
The idea of the mismatch index is to compare the observed allocation of unemployed work-
ers across sectors with an ideal allocation. The constructed index presented here follows the 
theoretical environment proposed by Sahin et al. (2014). In the model, unemployed workers 
are allocated according to a social planner, who has no limitations in moving idle labour 
across sectors, but frictions are assumed to have an effect on the matching within markets. 
By constructing the planner’s solution, we are able to determine the optimal number of hires 
that can be obtained by the planner’s allocation of job seekers across sectors. The difference 
between the optimal and observed hires equals the fraction of lost hires that is represented 
by the mismatch index. Through generating the counterfactual unemployment rate, this 
method allows us to estimate the share of unemployment caused by mismatch across sectors.  
This model is distinctive in a sense that no equilibrium allocations need to be solved. The 
empirical joint distribution of unemployed job-seekers and vacancies across sectors is the 
equilibrium outcome of the model. Further, the counterfactual distribution is constructed 
from a simple planner’s problem that can be solved analytically (Sahin et al. 2014). Benefi-
cially, this setup is robust and easy to implement with a distinct labour market and with 
multiple sources of heterogeneity. Yet, a downside of this methodology is that it does not 
separately quantify sources of misallocation and results are presented only on a general level.  
Let’s next go through the theoretical logic behind the mismatch index. First, I will start by 
describing the economic environment, where different sectors have various vacancy rates 
and matching efficiencies. Then, this environment is generalized by heterogeneity in produc-
tivity and job destruction rates across the labour market. Further, to derive the ideal unem-
ployment rate in various sectors, the planner’s optimal allocation rule is derived. This chap-
ter demonstrates a recapitulation of the formal solution. 
4.1 Benchmark environment  
To start with, in the benchmark environment the economy is composed of a large number I 
sectors indexed by i. Time is discrete and indexed by t. Vacancies (vit) are assumed to arise 
exogenously across sectors. The labour force consists of risk-neutral individuals who can 
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either be employed in sector i (eit) or unemployed in sector i (uit).
2 In the baseline model only 
unemployed individuals are searching for work and on-the-job search is ruled out, but later 
this restriction is relaxed to obtain a more realistic composition of job seekers. Also, people 
outside labour force are not seen as job-seekers. Labour productivity in sector i at time t is 
denoted as zit, which is strictly positive across sectors. 
Further, the labour market is assumed to be frictional and new hires (hit) between unem-
ployed (uit) and vacancies (vit) are determined by the matching function Φ𝑡𝜙𝑖𝑡𝑚(𝑢𝑖𝑡, 𝑣𝑖𝑡), 
where m is strictly increasing and concave in both arguments (uit, vit) and homogenous of 
degree one. The term Φ𝑡𝜙𝑖𝑡 measures matching efficiency in sector i with Φ𝑡 denoting the 
aggregate component and 𝜙𝑖𝑡 the idiosyncratic sector-level component.  
4.2 Planner’s solution 
The planner’s solution is a socially optimal rule to allocate unemployed workers across sec-
tors. The condition demonstrated in Equation 4 below states that the planner allocates more 
job-seekers to the labour market with more vacancies and higher matching efficiencies to 
equalize their marginal contributions to the hiring process across markets. 
 
𝜙𝑖𝑡𝑚𝑢1 (
𝑣1𝑡
𝑢1𝑡
∗ ) = ⋯ = 𝜙𝑖𝑡𝑚𝑢1 (
𝑣𝑖𝑡
𝑢𝑖𝑡
∗ ) = ⋯ =  𝜙𝑖𝑡𝑚𝑢𝐼 (
𝑣𝐼𝑡
𝑢𝐼𝑡
∗ ), (4) 
where mui is the derivative of the m function with respect to ui. Planner’s allocation is de-
noted by “*”. 
Now, this planner’s allocation rule is used to derive the mismatch index, which measures the 
fraction of hires lost in a specific sector i.e. (1-ht/ht
*), where ht denotes the observed hires 
and ht
* the optimal number of hires in the planner’s solution. Suppose there are i sectors in 
the economy (regions or occupations) with a given number of vacancies and sector-specific 
as well as aggregate matching efficiencies. Then, the number of hires in each sector can be 
determined by the following matching function in Cobb-Douglas form: 
 ℎ𝑖𝑡 = Φ𝑡𝜙𝑖𝑡𝑣𝑖𝑡
𝛼𝑢𝑖𝑡
1−𝛼, (5) 
                                                 
2 Hence, ∑ (𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡) = 1
𝐼
𝑖=1  
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where hit are hires in sector i at date t, Φt is the aggregate matching efficiency, 𝜙𝑖𝑡 is the 
sector-specific matching efficiency, vit is the vacancies and uit the unemployment in sector i 
at time t and α ∈(0,1).  
4.3 Mismatch index 
To get an intuition of the mismatch index let’s consider a simplified environment where 
sectors are homogeneous i.e. sector-specific productivities and matching efficiencies are 
omitted. Now, the optimal solution simply equalizes the ratio of vacancies and unemploy-
ment across sectors.  
Summing across all sectors the aggregate amount of hires at time t is 
 
ℎ𝑡 = Φ𝑡𝑣𝑡
𝛼𝑢𝑡
1−𝛼 [∑ (
𝑣𝑖𝑡
𝑣𝑡
)
∝
(
𝑢𝑖𝑡
𝑢𝑡
)
1−∝
𝐼
𝑖=1
] (6) 
and the optimal amount of hires is  
 ℎ𝑡
∗ = Φ𝑡𝑣𝑡
𝛼𝑢𝑡
1−𝛼 (7) 
Hence 1 − ∑ (
𝑣𝑖𝑡
𝑣𝑡
)
∝
(
𝑢𝑖𝑡
𝑢𝑡
)
1−∝
𝐼
𝑖=1  is the fraction of hires lost due to asymmetric distribution of 
vacancies and unemployment. Further, the mismatch index can be described as 
 
𝑀𝑡
ℎ = 1 −
ℎ𝑡
ℎ𝑡
∗ = 1 −
Φ𝑡𝑣𝑡
𝛼𝑢𝑡
1−𝛼 [∑ (
𝑣𝑖𝑡
𝑣𝑡
)
∝
(
𝑢𝑖𝑡
𝑢𝑡
)
1−∝
𝐼
𝑖=1 ]
Φ𝑡𝑣𝑡
𝛼𝑢𝑡
1−𝛼  
(8) 
 
 
𝑀𝑡
ℎ = 1 − ∑ (
𝑣𝑖𝑡
𝑣𝑡
)
∝
(
𝑢𝑖𝑡
𝑢𝑡
)
1−∝
𝐼
𝑖=1
 (9) 
This simplified form has close resemblance with a simple correlation measurement of va-
cancies and job-seekers between sectors. The empirical evidence using this index absent any 
heterogeneity among sectors is also demonstrated in the empirical part. 
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Now, let’s assume heterogeneity across sectors and account it in our index. Let’s first con-
sider an economy, where the labour market differs in matching efficiencies but not in produc-
tivities. Thus, summing up hires across sectors the aggregate number of hires, ht, are given 
by 
 
ℎ𝑡 = Φ𝑡𝑣𝑡
𝛼𝑢𝑡
1−𝛼 [∑ ∅𝑖𝑡 (
𝑣𝑖𝑡
𝑣𝑡
)
∝
(
𝑢𝑖𝑡
𝑢𝑡
)
1−∝
𝐼
𝑖=1
] (10) 
Further, when planner allocates the unemployed workers across sectors the optimal amount 
of hires, ht
*, becomes 
 
ℎ𝑡
∗ = Φ𝑡𝑣𝑡
𝛼𝑢𝑡
1−𝛼 [∑ ∅𝑖𝑡 (
𝑣𝑖𝑡
𝑣𝑡
)
∝
(
𝑢𝑖𝑡∗
𝑢𝑡
)
1−∝
𝐼
𝑖=1
] (11) 
and the mismatch index becomes  
 
𝑀∅𝑡
ℎ = 1 −
ℎ𝑡
ℎ𝑡
∗ = 1 −
Φ𝑡𝑣𝑡
𝛼𝑢𝑡
1−𝛼 [∑ ∅𝑖 (
𝑣𝑖𝑡
𝑣𝑡
)
∝
(
𝑢𝑖𝑡
𝑢𝑡
)
1−∝
𝐼
𝑖=1 ]
Φ𝑡𝑣𝑡
𝛼𝑢𝑡
1−𝛼∅𝑡
 (12) 
 
𝑀∅𝑡
ℎ = 1 − ∑ (
∅𝑖
∅𝑡
)
𝐼
𝑖=1
 (
𝑣𝑖𝑡
𝑣𝑡
)
∝
(
𝑢𝑖𝑡
𝑢𝑡
)
1−∝
 (13) 
where ∅𝑡 = [∑ ∅𝑖𝑡
1
𝛼𝐼
𝑖=1 (
𝑣𝑖𝑡
𝑣𝑡
)]
𝛼
is an aggregator of the sector-level matching efficiencies. 
Next, let’s consider a similar economy, where labour market differs also in the level of pro-
ductive efficiency, zi in addition to matching efficiency Øit. To simplify notation, let’s define 
the sector overall efficiency as 𝑥𝑖𝑡 = 𝑧𝑖𝑡∅𝑖𝑡. 
The mismatch index can now be written as  
 
𝑀𝑥𝑡
ℎ = 1 −
ℎ𝑡
ℎ𝑡
∗ = 1 −
Φ𝑡𝑣𝑡
𝛼𝑢𝑡
1−𝛼 [∑ ∅𝑖 (
𝑣𝑖𝑡
𝑣𝑡
)
∝
(
𝑢𝑖𝑡
𝑢𝑡
)
1−∝
𝐼
𝑖=1 ]
Φ𝑡𝑣𝑡
𝛼𝑢𝑡
1−𝛼∅𝑥𝑡
 (14) 
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𝑀𝑥𝑡
ℎ = 1 −
ℎ𝑡
ℎ𝑡
∗ = 1 − ∑ (
∅𝑖𝑡
∅𝑥𝑡
) (
𝑣𝑖𝑡
𝑣𝑡
)
∝
(
𝑢𝑖𝑡
𝑢𝑡
)
1−∝
𝐼
𝑖=1
 (15) 
where ∅𝑥𝑡 is an aggregate of market-level overall efficiencies weighted by their vacancy 
share. 
 
∅𝑥𝑡 = ∑ ∅𝑖𝑡 (
𝑥𝑖𝑡
𝑥𝑡
)
1−∝
∝
(
𝑣𝑖𝑡
𝑣𝑡
)
𝐼
𝑖=1
 (16) 
and  
 
𝑥𝑡 = (∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑡
1
𝛼  
𝐼
𝑖=1
𝑣𝑖𝑡
𝑣𝑡
)
𝛼
 (17) 
The mismatch index has three useful properties, which are also relevant in empirical meas-
urements. Most importantly, Mt is increasing in the level of disaggregation of sectors. There-
fore, mismatch should always be considered with respect to the degree of the level of dis-
aggregation (Sahin et al. 2014). Also, the number of sectors should be as equal as possible 
when different dimensions are compared (Marthin 2012). Second, the index is between zero 
and one (0 < 𝑀𝑡 < 1). Under maximum mismatch vacancies and job-seekers do not coexist 
in any market and the mismatch index equals one. If there is no mismatch in any sector, the 
index equals zero. Finally the third property states that an aggregate shock, which changes 
the total number of vacancies or job-seekers but leave the shares across sectors unaffected, 
does not shift the mismatch index. 
4.4 Counterfactual unemployment 
Despite the intuitive results of the mismatch index, it doesn’t give an answer to the magni-
tude of the effect mismatch has on the unemployment rate. To do this, a counterfactual un-
employment rate absent mismatch is constructed, which is then compared with the actual 
observed unemployment rate.  
Nonetheless, approximating the counterfactual unemployment is problematic since it re-
quires to take a stand of the equilibrium of an unobserved counterfactual economy (Elsby et 
al. 2015). This counterfactual economy is unknown and therefore direct reflections of lost 
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hires on unemployment are impossible to draw. The optimal unemployment rate is still use-
ful to outline to get an idea of the approximate magnitude of mismatch. Nevertheless, these 
estimations should be approached cautiously as the counterfactual unemployment is a result 
of an iteration problem, where previous levels of unemployment affect current state directly. 
First, the job-finding rate is the observed probability of unemployment outflow. As calculat-
ing ft as per Sahin proved to be problematic
3, I decided to follow Shimer (2005) in defining 
the job-finding rate as follows:  
 
𝑓𝑡 = 1 −
𝑢𝑡+1 − 𝑢𝑡+1
𝑠
𝑢𝑡
 (18) 
where 𝑢𝑡
𝑠 is the amount of short-term unemployed.4 Then, the index modelled above can be 
used to derive a more efficient job-finding rate 
 
Optimal job finding rate: 𝑓𝑡
∗ =
ℎ𝑡
∗
𝑢𝑡
∗ = Φ𝑡 (
𝑣𝑡
𝑢𝑡
∗)
∝
= 𝑓𝑡
1
(1−𝑀𝑥𝑡
ℎ )
(
𝑢𝑡
𝑢𝑡
∗)
∝
 (19) 
This counterfactual job-finding rate ft
* is always higher than the observed job-finding rate ft
, 
as the mismatch index 𝑀𝑥𝑡
ℎ   is between 0 and 1 and the ratio of actual and counterfactual 
unemployment rate 
𝑢𝑡
𝑢𝑡
∗ is always greater than one. Hence, this leads to lower counterfactual 
unemployment rates. 
Shimer (2005) defines separation rate from employment as  
 
𝑠𝑡 =
𝑢𝑡+1
𝑠
𝑒𝑡
, (20) 
which estimates the inflow to unemployment as proxy for separations. Unfortunately, the 
data does not verify, whether the flow is from out of the labour force or from employment, 
so in this sense it is imperfect. Moreover, Shimer (2005) argues that calculating separation 
rate as the ratio of short-term unemployed workers to employed workers leads to a signifi-
cant time-aggregation bias. Therefore, Shimer adjusts this by adding the job-finding rate to 
the equation to take into account the possibility of finding another job within a month. None-
                                                 
3 Sahin defines job-finding rate as 𝑓𝑡 = (1 − 𝑀𝑥𝑡
ℎ )Φ𝑡∅𝑥𝑡 (
𝑢𝑡
𝑢𝑡
)
∝
. My results showed job-finding rate over 1 
consecutively, which would mean that hirings would exceed the number of job-seekers in several months.  
4 In my data set, I am able to specify those unemployed less than a month as short-term 
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theless, Marthin (2012) argues that this is unnecessary if the unemployment duration is esti-
mated down to one week as in my case it is, because becoming unemployed and directly 
getting re-employed in one week is unlikely. Since the Finnish data provides similarly high 
weekly frequency, I decide to leave the job-finding rate out as well.  
Given an initial value of u0
*, which is chosen to satisfy the planner’s solution in Equation 4, 
the counterfactual unemployment rate can be obtained by iterating forward on the equation  
 𝑢𝑡+1
∗ = 𝑠𝑡 + (1 − 𝑠𝑡 − 𝑓𝑡
∗)𝑢𝑡
∗ (21) 
4.5 Derivation of sector-specific optimal allocation of job-seekers 
This notation of optimal allocation is derived following the example by Marthin et al. (2012). 
First, let’s start the derivation of optimal job-seeker allocation by rewriting the Planner’s 
solution with sector-specific productivities and efficiencies (Equation 4): 
 
𝑧𝑖𝑡𝑚𝑢1 (
𝑣1𝑡
𝑢1𝑡
∗ ) = ⋯ = 𝑧𝑖𝑡𝑚𝑢1 (
𝑣𝑖𝑡
𝑢𝑖𝑡
∗ ) = ⋯ =  𝑧𝑖𝑡𝑚𝑢𝐼 (
𝑣𝐼𝑡
𝑢𝐼𝑡
∗ ) (22) 
Now, according to this solution job-seekers should be allocated to equal the marginal utility 
of an additional job-seeker in each sector. Hence, more job-seekers are allocated to sectors 
with higher efficiency and productivity.  
Matching function was defined as  
 𝑚(𝑣𝑖, 𝑢𝑖) = 𝑣𝑖𝑡
𝛼𝑢𝑖𝑡
1−𝛼 (23) 
Now, plugging this matching function (23) to planner’s solution (22) gives 
 
𝑧1𝜙1 (
𝑣1
𝑢1
∗)
𝛼
= 𝑧𝑖𝜙𝑖 (
𝑣𝑖𝑡
𝑢𝑖𝑡
∗ )
𝛼
= ⋯ =  𝑧𝐼𝑚𝐼 (
𝑣𝐼𝑡
𝑢𝐼𝑡
∗ )
𝛼
 (24) 
Let’s assume the labour market to consist only from two sectors. Then, the solution above 
contract to  
 
𝑧𝑖𝜙𝑖 (
𝑣𝑖𝑡
𝑢𝑖𝑡
∗ )
𝛼
= 𝑧𝑗𝜙𝑗 (
𝑣𝑗𝑡
𝑢𝑗𝑡
∗ )
𝛼
, (25) 
which can be rearranged to obtain expression for uit
* 
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𝑢𝑖𝑡
∗ =
𝑣𝑖𝑡
𝑣𝑗𝑡
𝑢𝑗𝑡
∗  (𝑧𝑖𝜙𝑖)
1
𝛼
(𝑧𝑗𝜙𝑗)
1
𝛼
   (26) 
 
Summing this across j sectors 
 
∑ 𝑢𝑗𝑡
∗ = 𝑢𝑡 = ∑
𝑣𝑖𝑡
𝑣𝑗𝑡
𝐽
𝑗=1
𝑢𝑖𝑡
∗
 (𝑧𝑗𝜙𝑗)
1
𝛼
(𝑧𝑖𝜙𝑖)
1
𝛼
=  ∑  (𝑧𝑗𝜙𝑗)
1
𝛼𝑣𝑗𝑡
𝐽
𝑗=1
 
𝑢𝑖𝑡
∗
𝑣𝑖𝑡(𝑧𝑖𝜙𝑖)
1
𝛼
𝐽
𝑗=1
 (27) 
Finally, by rearranging the above and noting that 
∑ (𝑣𝑖𝑡(𝑧𝑖𝑡𝜙𝑖)
1
𝛼 ) =𝐼𝑖=1 ∑ (𝑣𝑗𝑡(𝑧𝑗𝑡𝜙𝑗)
1
𝛼 )𝐽𝑗=1  we can express the optimal unemployment in 
sector i at time t shown in Equation 28. This allows us to estimate the optimal allocation of 
job-seekers across sectors.  
 
𝑢𝑖𝑡
∗ =  (𝑧𝑖𝜙𝑖)
1
𝛼
𝑣𝑖𝑡
∑ (𝑣𝑖𝑡(𝑧𝑖𝑡𝜙𝑖)
1
𝛼 )𝐼𝑖=1
𝑢𝑡   (28) 
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5 Data 
The data is retrieved from the Ministry of Labour employment register5 covering 112 months 
from 2006 to April 2015. This panel data set includes information on job seekers, vacancies 
and hirings reported in the local labour offices (LLO’s) on occupational and regional dimen-
sions.  The time span is restricted by what is made publically available by the Ministry. 
Nevertheless, the time frame is arguably adequate for this study, since it covers several years 
before and after the burst of the financial crisis in 2008.   
The data at hand is convenient for matching function studies for several reasons. First, the 
frequency is high; monthly data is required for empirical measurement, since the majority of 
vacancies are usually filled within a month or two and majority of unemployment spells end 
within the same time frame. High frequency also reduces temporal aggregation problems 
discussed earlier. Second, the data set contains information both from the characteristics of 
job seekers as well as vacancies, which enables an accurate disaggregation of the data to 
obtain information on the effect of certain characteristics of job seekers in matching (Lahto-
nen, 2006). Third, the data set includes also job seekers, who are employed or currently out 
of labour force but have registered in their local labour office. This attribute enables the 
examination of on-the-job search. Also, a favourable attribute of the data is monthly fre-
quency and the reporting of inflows in addition to the beginning of the period stocks. 
Information on hirings is usually complicated to obtain, which is why empirical studies use 
other ways to measure them. Typical proxies include the total employment inflow, unem-
ployment outflow and the flow of filled vacancies (Hynninen et al., 2009). In this study, I 
chose the unemployment outflow as a measurement for hirings (the output of the matching 
function) due to good data availability. Specifically, with regional data I am able to separate 
the unemployment outflow to employment, which prevents the bias that job-seeker outflow 
to out-of-the-labour-force could cause. Unfortunately, the data set does not enable this for 
occupational data, for where only the total unemployment outflow is available. This causes 
the job finding rate to be overestimated in the occupational dimension. Here I also tested the 
use of ended job searches, which amount to significantly less on monthly basis compared to 
                                                 
5 see www.toimialaonline.fi 
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flow out of unemployment. Also, here it is not specified, whether the search for a job-seeker 
ended to employment or out of the labour force.  
Job-seekers, who are classified as having been employed through employment services, have 
been filtered from the unemployment outflow to get an unbiased variable. 6  Nonetheless, 
workers, who have shifted from working reduced week or have temporarily been laid off, 
but have again continued regular working time, are included in the outflow. Finally, entre-
preneurs, who receive a start-up grant belong to the outflow as well. The independent vari-
ables, job-seekers and vacancies are the sum of the end-stock of previous month added with 
the inflow during the current month. 7 
In the context of empirical matching function studies, it is relevant to distinguish the sectors, 
where matches can be realistically made (Klinger and Rothe, 2012). Spatially, several inter-
national studies have focused on distinguishing relevant local travel-to-work-areas to form 
relevant sectors (see e.g. prefectures in Japan used by Kano and Ohta (2005) or Burda and 
Profit (1996) with local labour offices in Czech Republic). Hence, travel-to-work areas as 
regional aggregation would arguably make the most realistic setting and is also preferred by 
most studies. However, only part of the Finnish data is provided based on the 70 travel-to-
work areas in Finland. Because of the data, I use Centres for Economic Development, 
Transport and the Environment (ELY Centres) as regions in the model, which also broadly 
represent travel-to-work areas. There are a total of 17 ELY-centres in Finland, but Åland 
Islands is excluded due to its isolation of the other labour market regions which are all large 
enough to be considered as a separate labour market.8 
I prefer occupational disaggregation instead of industrial partly due to better data availabil-
ity, but also because occupations provide a more realistic market, within which workers 
might find jobs. Fahr and Sunde (2001) argue that basically all job-seekers are more attached 
to their profession than to the industry they work in. Moreover, separating labour markets 
                                                 
6 “A job-seeker is classified as having been “employed through employment services” if his/her employer is 
granted pay subsidy or if a government departments or agencies have been allocated funds for covering the 
employment costs resulting from hiring the job-seeker (those employed by the State).” (Ministry of Employ-
ment and the Economy, retrieved 29.9.2015 https://www.tem.fi/en/work/employment_service_statistics/defi-
nitions_tables_and_figures/registered_jobseekers) 
7 These variable are chosen to encompass the stock-flow nature of matching in the best possible way as ex-
plained in chapter 3.6. 
8 The ELY-centres in the data include also a “Foreign countries” classification, which presumably contains 
vacancies and job-seekers abroad that are reported in LLO’s. However, this group is also excluded from the 
data as I focus only on the local labour market. 
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by occupation also takes better into account the skill requirements, education and matching 
qualities for certain jobs than industry classification, which usually employ all sorts of oc-
cupations. It would be even more meaningful to study the educational unemployment rates 
than occupational, as education is even more stable characteristic of a worker than occupa-
tion (Layard et al. 2005).  
Occupations are disaggregated according to the layers represented by ISCO9 definition. In 
this study, I use only the first and second level from the four possible ones. The first level, 
ISCO10, is divided into ten different occupations as for instance managers or professionals. 
The second level, ISCO50, is a more precise classification and has 50 occupations, such as 
chief executives, senior officials and legislators or subsistence farmers, fishers, hunters and 
gatherers.10 The study is restricted to these two ISCO levels, since the number of hires on 
two more specific levels would have small group sizes and several missing data points, 
which would weaken the statistical analysis. Fortunately, the Ministry of Employment and 
the Economy uses the ISCO standard so the occupational data is easily at hand.  
5.1 Data Coverage 
As with most similar studies, the data on vacancies has issues of incompleteness. First, jobs 
are underreported in LLO’s, since private firms do not have any lawful need to report va-
cancies (Rodenburg, 2011). Although in the Finnish context public employers have a statu-
tory duty to inform vacancies in LLO’s11. Nonetheless, private firms don’t have a clear fi-
nancial incentive to report vacancies in LLO’s, since they might find it more efficient to 
directly use other recruiting channels. Quite the contrary, unemployed workers are more 
willing to report to LLO’s as job-seekers, since this is insisted in receiving any unemploy-
ment benefits in Finland.  
Based on an employer survey, Räisänen (2014) estimates that slightly below 50 percent of 
employers use LLO’s as a recruiting channel.  During the sample period of 2006-2013 the 
                                                 
9 ISCO= International Standard Classification of Occupations, maintained by International Labour Organiza-
tion 
10 Army officials and army workers were combined in the ISCO50 level, since their labour market status can 
be assumed to be similar. Also, I removed the occupation street vendors and shoeblacks due to lack of data 
points. Moreover, category X was not included in either panel data sets. This group contains students, entre-
preneurs and those with no defined occupation. The effect of excluding this group remains minimal, since the 
data points are few and far between with unsubstantial shares in total job-seekers and vacancies. 
11 See act 1348/2002 on vacancy reporting http://www.finlex.fi/fi/laki/alkup/2002/20021348 retrieved 
30.11.12015 
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use of LLO’s in recruiting has shown a slightly increasing trend with a varying share between 
37 to 46 percent. Nevertheless, the importance of state-run employment offices in recruiting 
in the Finnish labour market should not be understated. The establishments still find local 
labour offices having the most significant effect on filling the vacancy from all recruiting 
channels (Räisänen, 2014). Nonetheless, Soininen (2006) argues that a general view is that 
vacancies in workforce offices are low-skill biased since high-skill jobs are matched else-
where. This possible bias is good to keep in mind when assessing the results but unfortu-
nately the data set does not enable the control of this possible skill bias.  
The statistics from LLO’s can be considered as a reliable indicator for the behaviour of va-
cancies as long as the market share of LLO’s remain rather constant. Table 1 shows the most 
recent data on market share of LLO’s in firm recruiting according to the survey by Räisänen 
(2014).  
Table 1 The usage of LLO in recruiting (%) 
 
However, Hynninen (2007), argues that job seeker/vacancy ratio is countercyclical. In an 
economic downturn finding a job is hard, since many job-seekers compete of a few open 
vacancies available. From the employer point of view, filling a vacancy is more expensive 
in an economic upturn, since fewer workers are searching. The data supports these argu-
ments, as the amount of vacancies show a significant drop at the start of the crisis, while 
simultaneously the amount of job-seekers peaked12. Also, Michaillat (2012) states that dur-
ing recessions the acute job shortage diminishes the effect of matching frictions and each 
job is filled quickly. Even though the share of reported vacancies shows this procyclical 
trend, it seems to be stable enough to provide a reliable measurement of vacancies. 
Moreover, to assess the data coverage thoroughly, let’s compare it with a quarterly survey 
conducted by Statistics Finland. This survey gathers data of an annual sample size of around 
10 000 workplaces13. Figure 2 below demonstrates that the yearly averages of vacancies 
reported by the Ministry of Employment (TEM) are constantly below the average measured 
                                                 
12 The average monthly number of job-seekers amounted around 242 000 during years 2007 and 2008 and over 
300 000 during years 2009 and 2010.  
13 The sample population is around 150 000 active establishments that are listed in the register maintained by 
Statistics Finland. See http://tilastokeskus.fi/til/atp/index.html for further information. 
Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Market share 44 % 43 % 41 % 39 % 37 % 42 % 46 % 46 %
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by Statistics Finland. The share of vacancies reported by TEM is 20-30 percent lower in 
comparison with the survey. Nevertheless, the ratio between the reported vacancies remains 
arguably constant enough to allow robust estimations from the vacancies reported by TEM. 
The amount of unemployed job-seekers varies also between TEM and Statistics Finland due 
to different unemployment definitions14. Nonetheless, these differences do not affect the data 
coverage specifically, since the definition causes only constant variation in the unemploy-
ment measurements, which does not affect the reliability of my estimates. 
Niemeläinen (2014) notes that the vacancy data from TEM is also positively correlated with 
vacancies reported in an online recruiting agency (Oikotie). Moreover, she notes that the two 
sources convey similar information of the amount of vacancies, but the data provided by 
TEM covers the whole country more comprehensively than the online agency. 
5.2 Productive Efficiency 
On the regional level labour productivity is calculated by simply comparing the regional 
differences in output values. The annual values of production in each ELY-centre are re-
trieved from a database maintained by Statistics Finland15. First, I index all the production 
value levels (2006=1) and thereafter I normalize the values for annual productivity around 
                                                 
14 According to Statistics Finland the main explanation is that the Labour Force survey by Statistics Finland 
also accounts for disguised unemployment i.e. “persons outside the labour force who would want gainful work 
and would be available for work within a fortnight, but who have not actively looked for work in the past four 
weeks”. http://www.stat.fi/til/tyti/kas_en.html retrieved 10.12.2015. 
15 The data was retrieved from toimialaonline.fi, where the regional accounts are stored. The latest available 
data was December 2014, which I decided to use for the data points in the beginning of 2015 as well.  
Figure 2 Yearly average of vacancies 
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the average for all regions in the specific year. Finally, these relative differences in produc-
tivity are used as proxy to measure the differences in labour productivity. Since regional 
production value is provided only on an annual basis, I use the yearly value for each month 
of that specific year assuming that monthly changes in productivity remain sufficiently low.   
At the occupational level, I use annual data on salaries from the Statistics Finland as a meas-
ure of productivity. Sahin et al. (2014) argue that wages are an imperfect proxy, since besides 
productivity they are affected by unionization rates, compensation rates and monopoly rents. 
To address this they normalize the wages around average for each occupation.  I conduct 
this in my calculations similarly as for the regional productivities. Again, yearly values for 
productivity are used for each month in that specific year. The differences in both regional 
and occupational productivities turn out to be very small and thus have only a minimal effect 
on the mismatch indices. 
5.3 Matching function estimation 
The matching efficiencies are estimated by performing fixed effects panel regressions with 
hirings per unemployed job-seekers as dependent variable and vacancies per unemployed 
job-seekers as explanatory variable. The matching function is assumed to have constant re-
turns to scale. The Cobb-Douglas form used as a baseline specification is then transformed 
into log-linear form by taking logarithms on both sides. This way we get clear implications 
for the elasticity parameters.  
 
𝑙𝑛 (
ℎ𝑖𝑡
𝑢𝑖𝑡
) = 𝑙𝑛Φ𝑡 + 𝑙𝑛 𝜙𝑖 + 𝛼𝑙𝑛 (
𝑣𝑖𝑡
𝑢𝑖𝑡
) (29) 
Now, 𝑙𝑛Φ𝑡 is the time fixed effects and will be interpreted as the time variation in matching 
efficiency. Basically the time variation is captured with yearly time dummies. Additionally, 
each time series are Hodrick-Prescott filtered (with parameter 100) to eliminate high fre-
quency changes and cyclical patterns and better visualise the changes.  
The sector fixed effects is denoted as 𝑙𝑛 𝜙𝑖 and finally, α is the vacancy share interpreted as 
the elasticity of matching function. The sectoral matching efficiency parameters,𝜙𝑖, will 
capture all the sector-specific shifts divergent from the aggregate matching efficiency. The 
exponents of 𝑙𝑛 𝜙𝑖 are treated as deviations from the geometric mean to derive relative dif-
ferences between the sectors.  
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Fixed effects regression is convenient to evaluate the time-invariant characteristics of the 
sectors. However, fixed effects tend to catch the returns to scale effects especially when 
regions differ widely in scales, which implicates an estimation bias (Ibourk et al. 2004).  
Table 2 presents the whole set of the vacancy share parameter. The standard errors are cor-
rected to take into account the correlation of error term over time within the sector.  
In the aggregate regressions elasticity seems to drop from 0.41 to 0.32 when yearly dummy 
variables are used to capture time fixed effects. In the panel regressions, elasticity is lower 
varying between 0.28 and as low as 0.09. I decided to use an average vacancy share of 0.3. 
This value provides an upper bound nature of results and is in the range of previous research 
as well. Using a higher elasticity will put more weight on the distribution of vacancies and a 
lower efficiency will weigh more the sector-specific efficiencies (Marthin, 2012). The most 
realistic setting would probably be to use different vacancy shares for all sectors, but I chose 
to use a homogeneous alpha to simplify comparability.  
These elasticity estimates are consistently lower than those obtained by Sahin et al., who 
decide to use 0.5 as an estimation of the vacancy share.16 Yet, my estimates follow the elas-
ticities obtained by Marthin (2012) with Swedish data. He argues that the results obtained 
by Sahin et al. in the US may partly reflect the traditional view of the US labour market as 
having a high job-finding rate and hence large elasticities. Further, Marthin argues that the 
lack of appropriate data for stock-flow matching could be one reason for lower elasticities 
than measured in US. With the geographic case, I have slightly higher elasticities than Mar-
thin, but in the aggregate and occupational cases the elasticities are almost equal. As per 
Kangasharju et al. (2005), including variables measuring the flow of new vacancies and job 
                                                 
16 In the aggregate regressions they report vacancy share parameters between 0.32 and 0.67 without specifying 
the values more carefully. In the panel regression their estimates vary between 0.24 and 0.53 showing signifi-
cantly higher elasticity parameter than my estimations. 
Note: Year-dummy is added to capture for time fixed effects in the aggregated data. The occupation-specific 
elasticity is based on the more disaggregated ISCO 50 occupational data.   
α
Robust 
standard 
errors
t
Aggregated 0.41*** 0.09 4.5
With time fixed effects 0.32*** 0.08 4.3
Sector fixed effects
Geographic 0.28*** 0.02 12.79
Occupation 0.09*** 0.02 3.57
Table 2 Elasticities 
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seekers increases the magnitude of elasticities, which might explain part of the increase in 
my results as well.  
It is worth noting that the number of vacancies posted by firms may be affected by shocks 
to unobserved matching function. Simple OLS regression of the job finding rate on labour 
market tightness is exposed to simultaneity bias (Borowczyk et al. 2013). Hence, when esti-
mating the matching functions one should consider the possible endogeneity problem of va-
cancies. Sahin et al. approach this problem by modelling the matching efficiency through 
time-varying polynomials as suggested by Borowczyk et al. In my estimations, I replace the 
time trend used by Sahin et al. with yearly dummies to obtain yearly observations for the 
variation of matching efficiency in time.  
5.4 Descriptive statistics 
The job finding rate and hirings per unemployed behave similarly over time as presented in 
Figure 3. Basically, both variables measure how many hirings occur in relation with job-
seekers, although the difference in magnitude is significant. Before the financial crisis hir-
ings seemed to be on a stable track, but from 2008 onwards both rates show a steep decline. 
The job finding rate has fallen from 0.30 to as low as 0.15 and hirings per unemployed have 
decreased from around 0.16 to below 0.06.  
Figure 3 Job finding rate and hirings per unemployed 
Note: Job-finding rate is calculated according to Equation 17 and hiring ratio (H/U) is simply hirings per unem-
ployed job-seekers.  
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One reason for the low hiring ratio is that it only includes the outflow from unemployment 
to employment registered in LLO’s, whereas job-finding rate describes the overall likelihood 
of finding work. Barnichon and Figura (2011) explain that the job finding rate is suggested 
to decline with unemployment duration. They show to cited reasons. First, long-term unem-
ployment reduces worker skills and networks in job-finding, making it more difficult to find 
employment. Further, prolonged unemployment may signal some unwanted characteristics 
of the job-seeker. This view is supported by the Finnish employment data, which shows a 
steep incline in long-term unemployment from 2009 onwards.17 The share of long-term un-
employed has exceeded 30 percent of the whole pool of unemployed job-seekers.  
Table 3 above demonstrates the regional descriptive statistics for the various ELY-centres. 
All figures are averages from 2006 to April 2015. The table reveals wide disparities across 
regions. On average, Pohjanmaa has had the lowest unemployment rate at 7.0 percent, 
whereas Pohjois-Karjala has had over twice as high unemployment at 14.7 percent. Also 
                                                 
17 Long-term unemployment is defined as unemployment duration over one year.   
Note: Vacancy rate is the ratio of vacancies and the labour force in the specific region. Tightness describes the 
ratio between vacancies and unemployed job seekers and hiring rate measures the ratio of unemployment period 
endings and the number of unemployed workers. All figures are averages over 2006 – April 2015.  
Unemployment rate 
(%)
Vacancy rate (%) Tightness Hiring rate
Uusimaa 7.5 1.3 0.16 0.07
Varsinais-Suomi 9.4 1.1 0.11 0.15
Satakunta 10.9 1.3 0.11 0.12
Häme 11.0 1.2 0.10 0.11
Pirkanmaa 11.2 1.1 0.09 0.10
Kaakkois-Suomi 12.3 1.2 0.09 0.11
Etelä-Savo 11.5 1.3 0.10 0.13
Pohjois-Savo 11.5 1.3 0.10 0.13
Pohjois-Karjala 14.7 1.0 0.06 0.13
Keski-Suomi 13.1 0.9 0.06 0.13
Etelä-Pohjanmaa 8.5 1.4 0.14 0.20
Pohjanmaa 7.0 1.4 0.18 0.14
Pohjois-Pohjanmaa 12.0 1.1 0.08 0.15
Kainuu 14.3 1.0 0.06 0.14
Lappi 14.1 1.6 0.10 0.17
mean 11.3 1.2 0.10 0.13
median 11.5 1.2 0.10 0.13
Table 3 Descriptive labour market statistics across regions  
38 
 
other variables show high variation but in divergent order relative to unemployment. Hence, 
labour market tightness seems to have an inverse relationship with the unemployment rate. 
Pohjanmaa has for instance the highest ratio between vacancies and unemployed job-seekers 
and the lowest unemployment rate of all regions. Hiring rate, on the other hand, seems to 
deviate from this link. Nevertheless, for this study the hiring rate offers interesting insights 
in regions ability to create matches. In fact, the hiring rate largely corresponds with the re-
gion-specific matching efficiencies presented earlier in matching function estimations. 
5.5 Overview of unemployment in Finnish labour market 
The employment shock in 2008 was far from the substantial increase in unemployment after 
the banking crisis in the beginning of 1990’s. At the time, the downtrend in the Finnish 
economy initiated a steep increase in the unemployment rate, which peaked at around 20 
percent in 1994. Contrary, for most of the 1980’s the unemployment rates were far below 
the European average at around five percent.  
Nonetheless, Finland went through a relatively quick recovery in terms of GDP growth after 
the 1990’s crisis. Still, the unemployment rate remained high on average through most of 
the 90’s despite the continuous minor improvement in employment. Koskela and Uusitalo 
(2004) claim that one reason for the rather sluggish recovery was that jobs created and de-
stroyed during and after the crisis were in different fields. This supports the view that struc-
tural changes occurring during deep economic depressions are one of the main reasons for 
Note: The figure shows the actual observed unemployment rate added with HP-filtered trend. The data is ex-
ceptionally retrieved from Statistics Finland to obtain sufficiently long time period. 
Figure 4 Finnish unemployment rate between 1989 and April 2015 
0.0
2.0
4.0
6.0
8.0
10.0
12.0
14.0
16.0
18.0
20.0
22.0
0.0
2.0
4.0
6.0
8.0
10.0
12.0
14.0
16.0
18.0
20.0
22.0
89 91 93 95 97 99 01 03 05 07 09 11 13 15
% %
39 
 
the prolonged long-term employment effects of financial crises (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009). 
This leads to an asymmetric impact of financial crisis on the labour market: the initial nega-
tive effect is deep in the beginning of the downturn following with a slow recovery. The high 
unemployment levels after the crisis in 1990’s demonstrate this well. In contrast, a similar 
affect has not been witnessed after the latest crisis.  
Initially, the negative shock due to the latest financial crisis was surprisingly well absorbed 
in the Finnish labour market. The average unemployment rate peaked at 8.7 percent in Fin-
land at the beginning of 2010, which was around one percentage point lower than the EU 
average.18 Schauman and Vanhala (2011) argue that thanks to temporary lay-offs, the actual 
redundancies and labour market search frictions remained lower than expected. Moreover, a 
drop in the labour force participation might be one explanation for the surprisingly modest 
incline at unemployment rate. Since 2008 the participation rate for the working age cohort 
(15-74 year old) has shown a steady decline from levels above 67 percent to below 65 per-
cent, which translates into an increase of 110 thousand individuals outside the labour force. 
Despite the quick adaptation of the labour market, unemployment in Finland has again 
started to rise contrary to the EU average. Schauman and Vanhala (2011) claim that regard-
less of the relatively small increase in unemployment compared with the steep drop of GDP 
at the beginning of 2010, the long-term unemployment still follows a peculiar trend to finan-
cial crisis. First, the share of long-term unemployed decreases due to the overall increase in 
unemployment. Thereafter, the share rises, since the inflow to unemployment starts to de-
crease. However, also the absolute number of long-term unemployed has shown a steady 
increase from around 40 thousand to over 110 thousand during 2009-201519. This large share 
of long-term unemployed might also reflect as a lagging increase in mismatch. Overall, dur-
ing the time span from 2006 to the beginning of 2015 unemployment has been rather steady 
in retrospect. Consequently, it is unlikely that labour matching has suffered as large negative 
changes after the latest financial crisis as in the 90’s.  
                                                 
18 EU average as per Eurostat harmonized monthly unemployment rate. 
19 Based on the October 2015 employment survey published by TEM.  
See https://www.tem.fi/files/44368/TKAT_Loka_2015.pdf Retrieved 3rd December 2015. 
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6 Results 
The results imply that mismatch unemployment exists in the Finnish labour market due to 
the imbalance of job seekers and vacancies. The construction of the mismatch indices and 
counterfactual unemployment rates reveal that the mismatch effect is somewhat larger in 
occupational than in regional dimension. I walk through the actual estimation results by first 
discussing the geographical and then the occupational mismatch indices. It should be kept 
in mind that the planner’s benchmark allocation is derived under costless reallocation, which 
leads to a tendency to an upper bound in results (Sahin et al. 2014).  
6.1 Geographical mismatch  
The 15 distinctive regions show wide variation in matching efficiencies. Table 4 presents 
each ELY-centre with its estimated matching efficiency. These efficiencies are averages 
over the whole time period. 
 
Table 4 Matching efficiencies across regions 
Notes: These matching efficiencies are obtained with an OLS regression with region-specific fixed effects, 
which is described more thoroughly in Section 5.3. ELY-centres are treated as group variables and yearly 
dummies are used to capture the variation in time. These matching efficiencies are the group fixed effects for 
each ELY-centre and they can be interpreted as the deviation from geometric mean. In other words, given 
that the vacancy per job seeker ratio would be equal in each region, for instance Lappi would hire 1.35 times 
more than the average across the whole country. 
ELY center Matching efficiency
Uusimaa 0.47
Varsinais-Suomi 1.16
Satakunta 0.92
Häme 0.84
Pirkanmaa 0.77
Kaakkois-Suomi 0.89
Etelä-Savo 1.02
Pohjois-Savo 1.04
Pohjois-Karjala 1.14
Keski-Suomi 1.09
Etelä-Pohjanmaa 1.47
Pohjanmaa 0.94
Pohjois-Pohjanmaa 1.16
Kainuu 1.20
Lappi 1.35
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Of all regions Uusimaa has clearly the lowest matching efficiency, which means that with 
an equal ratio of job seekers per vacancies with other regions, Uusimaa would hire over 50 
percent less workers than on average in the whole country.  In contrast, the most efficient 
region, Etelä-Pohjanmaa, would hire on average almost 50 percent more job-seekers than 
the geometric mean.  
The matching efficiencies demonstrate a vague negative relationship with unemployment 
rates shown in Table 3. It seems that regions with high unemployment have relatively high 
matching efficiency. Similar pattern is found by Bunders (2003) in the Finnish labour mar-
ket. He comes to a conclusion that regions with high unemployment rates such as Lappi and 
Pohjois-Karjala suffer from low labour demand instead of low efficiency or mismatch. How-
ever, high matching efficiency and high unemployment in these regions may also reflect the 
higher usage of employment services in search for work leading in more registrations in 
LLO’s (Ilmakunnas and Pesola, 2003).  
Moreover, a low vacancy rate may push the efficiency up for instance in Kainuu, where 
unemployment and matching efficiency are high simultaneously with one of the lowest va-
cancy rates. The weakest efficiency is found in central areas with rapid growth such as 
Uusimaa, where mismatch might have better ability to explain unemployment. Also, the low 
efficiency is in line with the results found by Hynninen (2007) that high population density 
has negative effect on matching efficiency. Despite the low efficiency in Uusimaa, the high 
tightness ratio indicates sufficient labour demand, which probably limits the rise in the un-
employment rate.  
Figure 5 below plots all three mismatch indices on regional level between 2006 and April 
2015. MØt and Mxt follow a similar path while Mt is significantly lower implying high simple 
correlation between vacancies and job-seekers across ELY-centres. Nevertheless, as the in-
dices MØt and Mxt include the large variations in the region-specific matching efficiencies 
shown in Table 4, they illustrate clearly higher mismatch. Hence, matching efficiency seem 
to have a higher effect on mismatch than the joint distribution of vacancies and job-seekers. 
Depending on the index used, the fraction of hires lost due to the imbalanced allocation of 
vacancies and job seekers ranges from 0.7 percent to 9.7 percent during the whole time pe-
riod. The index peaks on the last data point, April 2015, to 9.7 percent, which translates into 
more than 2377 lost hires. The rise in mismatch remained subtle during the financial crisis 
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and in 2012 the indices returned again roughly on the pre-crisis level. Hence, the aggregate 
shock seemed to hit the regions rather equally. However, the indices including efficiencies 
show a steady rise from 2013 onwards implying a rise in mismatch again.  
Figure 6 draws the counterfactual unemployment rate and the actual unemployment rate. As 
discussed in Section 4.4, the function is mostly illustrative since the calculations are based 
on an iteration with simplifying assumptions. I use the index MØt to estimate the counterfac-
tual rate, as this provides an upper bound of mismatch. The grey bars in the graph present 
the difference between the actual and counterfactual rate.  
The main finding here is that during the time period mismatch explains 1.5 to 3.0 percentage 
points of the whole unemployment rate. The difference shows a steady decline until the mid-
2008 but then the crisis seemed to initiate the widening of the gap between counterfactual 
and actual unemployment. From 2012 when the unemployment started to rise again, the gap 
started to show a steady incline. At the beginning of 2015, mismatch accounted for 3.0 per-
centage points of the actual unemployment rate. The unemployment effect estimated proves 
to be significantly larger than what is estimated in previous empirical work by Sahin et al. 
and Marthin, even though the estimated mismatch indices don’t have as large distinction.  
Figure 5 Geographical mismatch indices 
Note: The figure contains three different indices: Mt represents mismatch without taking into account region-
specific productivities and matching efficiencies. MØt includes sector-specific efficiencies and Mxt 
includes also sector specific productivities. 
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Figure 7 presents the efficient and actual allocation of job-seekers derived from the planner’s 
solution. On April 2015, slightly over 30 percent of job-seekers should be reallocated to form 
the optimal allocation. Most notably the share of job-seekers in Uusimaa should drop from 
26 percent to 6 percent because of the poorest matching efficiency in the area. Etelä-
Pohjanmaa should have 11 percentage points higher share amounting to 13 percent of the 
whole pool of unemployed job seekers. Matching efficiency has a significantly higher im-
pact on the efficient allocations compared to vacancy share due to the estimated low elastic-
ity.  
Note: The optimal allocation in this figure is derived in Section 4.5. This is an example of the efficient alloca-
tion at the latest point in time. Shares are used to make various sizes of regions comparable.   
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
0.35
0.40
U
u
s
im
a
a
V
a
rs
in
a
is
-S
u
o
m
i
S
a
ta
k
u
n
ta
H
ä
m
e
P
ir
k
a
n
m
a
a
K
a
a
k
k
o
is
-S
u
o
m
i
E
te
lä
-S
a
v
o
P
o
h
jo
is
-S
a
v
o
P
o
h
jo
is
-K
a
rj
a
la
K
e
s
k
i-
S
u
o
m
i
E
te
lä
-P
o
h
ja
n
m
a
a
P
o
h
ja
n
m
a
a
P
o
h
jo
is
-P
o
h
ja
n
m
a
a
K
a
in
u
u
L
a
p
p
i
Actual allocation of job-seekers
Efficient allocation of job seekers
Vacancy share
Figure 7 Actual and efficient allocation of job-seekers across regions 
Note: This graph compares the actual unemployment rate u with counterfactual unemployment rate u*. The 
grey bars denote the difference between the actual and efficient rate.  
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Figure 6 Counterfactual unemployment rate, regional level 
44 
 
6.2 Occupational mismatch 
Table 5 presents the matching efficiencies across ten occupation groups. The efficiencies 
show modest differences with Managers having the lowest efficiency (0.72) and Service and 
sales workers the highest efficiency (1.33). The low efficiencies for managers and armed 
forces occupations might result from underreporting of vacancies as these two groups show 
significantly less vacancies than other occupations. 
Figure 8 draws the mismatch indices across the ISCO10 occupation groups. Overall, all three 
indices behave similarly, but Mt index is lower than MØt and Mxt. Before the recession in 
mid-2007 the hires lost due to mismatch across occupations ranged from 2 to 4 percent.  
Thereafter, mismatch shows a steep increase in the early stages of financial crisis in 2008 
and in mid-2009 the share of lost hires vary between 6 and 10 percent.  
Note: This figure demonstrates the share of lost matches due to mismatch by occupation in each point in time. 
MØt includes sectoral matching efficiencies. Mxt summarizes also the differences in productivity across occu-
pations. Mt simply demonstrates the correlation of job-seekers and vacancies across sectors.  
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Figure 8 Occupational mismatch indices (ISCO10) 
Table 5 Occupation-specific matching efficiencies (ISCO10) 
ISCO10 Occupational group Matching efficiency
Service and sales workers 1.33
Craft and related trades workers 1.14
Skilled agricultural, forestry and fishery workers 1.05
Professionals 1.02
Elementary occupations 1.01
Clerical support workers 0.99
Technicians and associate professionals 0.98
Plant and machine operators, and assemblers 0.98
Armed forces occupations 0.84
Managers 0.72
Notes: These matching efficiencies on Table 5 and Table 6 are obtained with an OLS regression with occu-
pation-specific fixed effects, which is described more thoroughly in Section 5.3. 
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The indices stabilize relatively fast after the first shock and start to show a decline already 
in late-2009. Still, mismatch remains clearly above the pre-crisis level and show an increas-
ing trend since mid-2014. Sahin et al. (2014) note that their occupational indices start to 
increase one year ahead of the financial crisis. This pattern is not as clear in my results, even 
though mismatch starts to increase already in mid-2008, right in the earliest stage of the 
financial crisis.  
Table 6 Occupation specific matching efficiencies (ISCO50) 
ISCO50 Occupational group Matching efficiency
Personal care workers 1.59
Health associate professionals 1.43
Personal service workers 1.33
Food preparation assistants 1.31
Legal, social, cultural and related associate professionals 1.29
Food processing, wood working, garment and other craft workers 1.24
Teaching professionals 1.18
Information and communications technicians 1.16
Electrical and electronic trades workers 1.15
Cleaners and helpers 1.15
Hospitality, retail and other services managers 1.14
Legal, social and cultural professionals 1.11
Protective services workers 1.11
Metal, machinery and related trades workers 1.10
Building and related trades workers, excluding electricians 1.08
Market-oriented skilled agricultural workers 1.08
Armed forces occupations 1.07
Drivers and mobile plant operators 1.03
Handicraft and printing workers 1.03
Sales workers 1.03
General and keyboard clerks 1.01
Customer services clerks 0.99
Production and specialised services managers 0.99
Other clerical support workers 0.96
Science and engineering professionals 0.95
Health professionals 0.95
Assemblers 0.95
Science and engineering associate professionals 0.92
Stationary plant and machine operators 0.91
Market-oriented skilled forestry, fishery and hunting workers 0.89
Business and administration professionals 0.84
Information and communications technology professionals 0.84
Labourers in mining, construction, manufacturing and transport 0.82
Numerical and material recording clerks 0.79
Business and administration associate professionals 0.78
Agricultural, forestry and fishery labourers 0.73
Administrative and commercial managers 0.71
Refuse workers and other elementary workers 0.66
Chief executives, senior officials and legislators 0.63
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The disparities in efficiencies widen with 50 occupational groups. From Table 6 we notice 
that the group Personal care workers and Health associate professionals have the highest 
efficiencies. In contrast, within the manager group, Chief executives, senior officials and 
legislators have the lowest efficiency. This might be due to the low usage of LLO’s in their 
recruiting, as these are usually high-skilled jobs that might be matched elsewhere as noted 
by Soininen (2006). 
Figure 9 draws the lost hires across the 50 occupation groups. These mismatch indices follow 
similar pattern as on ISCO10-level but on a higher rate. Hence, it reflects the property of the 
mismatch index that the index increases in the level of disaggregation. The indices rise up 
to 8 percentage points in the beginning of 2008 and the highest index MØt peaks at 0.14. The 
timing of the increase in occupational mismatch seems to lead slightly the effect observed 
on geographical dimension. Mt implies on average 2.5 percentage point lower amount of lost 
hires than MØt and Mxt.  Contrary to regional indices, the occupational mismatch has been 
larger mismatch during the crisis than at the latest data point in early-2015. 
The estimated counterfactual unemployment rates on occupational dimension are presented 
in Figure 10. Again, I use MØt to measure the efficient allocation. The counterfactual rates 
with both occupational groups follow a similar behaviour, but seem to converge towards the 
latest data point. The counterfactual rates approached the actual rate in 2008 but the crisis 
again initiated a widening of the gap. 
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Figure 9 Occupational mismatch indices (ISCO50) 
Note: This figure demonstrates the share of lost matches due to mismatch by occupation in each point in 
time. MØt includes sectoral matching efficiencies. Mxt summarizes also the differences in productivity across 
occupations. Mt simply demonstrates the correlation of job-seekers and vacancies across sectors.  
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Also, occupational mismatch seems to explain overall a higher share of the actual unem-
ployment rate than regional mismatch. As discussed before, one reason might be that on 
occupational dimension the data does not specify outflow from unemployment to employ-
ment specifically but only the total outflow from unemployment.  
Occupational mismatch explains here on average 2.5 percentage points of the aggregate un-
employment rate during the whole time period. The gap shows recently a rising trend to-
wards the peak in late-2009 at around 3 percentage points. Hence, mismatch unemployment 
across occupations explains at most around one fifth of the actual unemployment rate.  
Figure 11 demonstrates the efficient allocation across ISCO10 specified occupation groups. 
As the matching efficiencies and vacancy shares already suggest, service and sales workers 
should have more than twice as large allocation of job-seekers as observed in April 2015. In 
contrast, the job-seeker allocation in the group craft workers should decrease from 25 per-
cent to around 10 percent.  
However, especially the occupational mismatch should be interpreted cautiously. The vari-
ous inefficiencies and reallocation issues are even harder to account for than in geographical 
dimension, as educational inflexibilities and differences in hiring processes are all included 
in the mismatch indices (Marthin, 2012).  
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Figure 10 Counterfactual unemployment rate, occupational level 
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I also assessed, whether job polarization - the falling demand for middle-skill routine work 
and labour concentration to high and low skilled work - is a useful concept to describe the 
labour market in Finland. According to Author et al. (2003), technological change is skill-
biased because exposure to computerization varies in different occupations. Hence, they cat-
egorize occupations to abstract or manual tasks and routine or non-routine tasks. Later, Goos 
and Manning (2007) illustrated that the routine tasks easily substituted by computers are 
most often middle-skill tasks and therefore technological change might lead to  job polari-
zation leading to concentration in high and low-skilled jobs. To study, whether the dynamics 
of mismatch is captured by this, I categorize ISCO10 occupations into four categories; cog-
nitive/non-routine, cognitive/routine, manual/non-routine, manual/routine as per Author et 
al. 2003. This categorisation is shown in Table 7 below.  
I find that this classification explains occupational mismatch well as it accounts for around 
80 percent of the ISCO10 level occupational mismatch. The vacancy share dropped espe-
cially for the manual occupations during the crisis, which caused naturally the increase in 
the vacancy shares of non-routine and cognitive occupations. Also the sector-specific effi-
ciencies are higher for the cognitive occupations. Interestingly job polarization does not ex-
plain the most recent rise of mismatch, since mismatch across these four categories shows a 
negative trend from 2013 onwards opposite to the occupational mismatch indices. 
Note: The optimal allocation in this figure is derived in Section 4.5. This is an example of the efficient alloca-
tion at the latest point in time. Shares are used to make various sizes of regions comparable.   
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6.3 Allowing on-the-job search 
I adjusted the model to allow on-the-job search by including all registered employed job 
seekers to the estimations. Naturally, this does not cover all employed job seekers but gives 
an idea of the effect of on-the-job search. This approach does neither account for ordinary 
job-to-job switches, where LLO receives no data of the new hiring. Still, this aspect is con-
sidered in order to study the robustness of chosen variables and to check, whether employed 
job-seekers cause any bias in the coefficients.  
Employed job-seekers form a large share of aggregate job-seekers in the data. For instance, 
in January 2015 there were slightly over 137 thousand employed job-seekers while unem-
ployed job-seekers amounted to 359 thousand. This share seems high, especially because 
these are actually registered job-seekers, who should be prepared to accept job offers from 
Local Labour Office. Nonetheless, both full time and part time workers and those who are 
employed by means of wage subsidies from the government are included.  
Adjusting the data with employed job seekers results only in minor changes in the mismatch 
index. For instance, the geographical mismatch with sector-specific efficiencies shows 0.986 
correlation between the adjusted and original one. Similarly, Sahin et al. find very small 
effects on mismatch indices when employed job seekers are added in the model.20 This sug-
gests that employed job-seekers are actually distributed similarly than unemployed workers 
and the mismatch index and vacancy per job-seekers shares remain unaffected.21 
                                                 
20 The correlation with the modified and original version is over 0.987, which imply a minimal effect. (Sahin 
et al. 2014) 
21 One of the attributes of the mismatch index is that an aggregate increase in vacancies or job-seekers does not 
affect the mismatch index if the shares between sectors remain intact.  
Table 7 Occupation classifications to study job polarization 
ISCO10 Occupational group Classification
Managers Cognitive/Non-Routine
Professionals Cognitive/Non-Routine
Technicians and associate professionals Cognitive/Non-Routine
Elementary occupations Cognitive/Non-Routine
Clerical support workers Cognitive/Routine
Service and sales workers Cognitive/Routine
Skilled agricultural, forestry and fishery workers Manual/Non-Routine
Craft and related trades workers Manual/Non-Routine
Armed forces occupations Manual/Non-Routine
Plant and machine operators, and assemblers Manual/Routine
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6.4 Limitations of the study 
I made some robustness checks with the job-seeker variable. When constructing the combi-
nation of stock and new inflow during the month of job-seekers, I added new job searches 
as the new inflow. I tested to switch this flow to new beginning unemployment periods, 
which on average sums up to roughly double the amount compared with the job searches. 
Yet, the effect when using this flow variable turned out to be minimal, as the correlation 
with the original mismatch index amounted to 0.99.  
Using a proper stock-flow specification was not possible with this data set, since the vacan-
cies and job-seekers belonging to the stock or flow are not identified specifically. Yet, this 
setup would have perhaps been more realistic than the approach I used in this study. As 
Lahtonen (2006) notes, on the aggregate level in the Finnish labour market only a small part 
are stock-stock matches. Instead most job-seekers match with the flow of new vacancies. At 
first, I used only the beginning of period stocks, but decided to add flow variables for job 
seekers and vacancies as well. Obtaining accurate information on the worker flows would 
provide an interesting comparison.  
Moreover, I decided to use a fixed elasticity parameter for the matching function of 0.3, as 
this is broadly the average of estimated elasticities and most of all provides an upper bound 
for mismatch. In reality, elasticity would show some variation in time and between sectors. 
Hence, static elasticity parameter is somewhat simplistic but on the other hand it offers good 
comparability. Sahin et al. find that overall using heterogeneous α leads to higher mismatch 
but only by 0.2 percentage points. Nonetheless, I made some sensitivity analysis by varying 
the vacancy share. Increasing vacancy share to 0.4 from the benchmark rate of 0.3 reduces 
mismatch rates and puts more weight on the joint distribution of vacancies and job seekers.  
The model used in this paper ignores the fact that workers might search for work on different 
occupation that they previously worked in. Yet, this direction of search is ignored because it 
has most relevance in the industry sector, where workers are least tied to their last sector. As 
discussed earlier in Section 5, Fahre and Sunde (2001) argue that workers are more attached 
to their profession than industry. Also the data does not specify if an individual job-seekers 
is hired in different occupation than documented by the job-seekers announcement in the 
beginning of unemployment.  
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Yet again, a major shortcoming of the model is that the formation of the mismatch indices 
don’t specify the causes of mismatch or explain the witnessed dynamics more carefully. In 
this study I attempted to provide outlines for potential interpretations of the mismatch dy-
namics, but a more thorough analysis would require further studies.   
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7 Conclusion 
In this study, I measure labour market mismatch in Finland between 2006 and April 2015 by 
calculating a mismatch index on geographical and occupational dimensions. This index com-
pares an efficient allocation between job-seekers and vacancies with the actual observed 
allocation to estimate labour mismatch. Overall, it seems that inefficient allocation of job-
seekers across sectors causes losses in hires and increases the aggregate unemployment rate.  
Spatially lost hires vary monthly between five and seven percent when sector-specific effi-
ciencies are considered. According to the estimated counterfactual unemployment, this could 
explain around one fifth of the aggregate unemployment rate. On the occupational level mis-
match increased sharply in 2008 as the financial crisis burst and the indices peaked between 
0.09 and 0.14 depending on the level of disaggregation. This explains up to three percentage 
points of the aggregate unemployment rate. Moreover, job polarization seems to account for 
a large part of occupational mismatch and therefore warrants further attention.  
Nonetheless, the most notable finding causing some concern is the recent trend in mismatch 
as the actual size of mismatch is open to interpretation. The results indicate that mismatch is 
currently increasing on all dimensions. Geographically mismatch already exceeds the level 
witnessed in the middle of the latest financial crisis and occupational mismatch has shown a 
growing trend since mid-2014. Also this probably translates into the current increase in the 
share of long-term unemployment hampering the labour market recovery in Finland. 
There are only a few previous studies using this method to measure mismatch. Nonetheless, 
at least studies with Swedish and American labour market data similarly indicate that occu-
pational mismatch affects unemployment more than geographical. In the US, regional mis-
match is almost non-existent reflecting flexible labour mobility. Mismatch is approximately 
on equal levels in Sweden, but the effect on the aggregate unemployment rate is reported 
being moderate in comparison with my estimations.  
The mismatch index proves as a convenient framework to further study the dynamics of 
matching on different labour market layers especially with the rich data provided in Finland. 
However, it should be kept in mind that the framework does not provide details of the causes 
behind inefficient allocation. Hence, further studies could concentrate on the sources behind 
the misallocations and sectoral disparities.  
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